BEFORE THE STATE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION

NANCY KEENAN

STATE OF MONTANA

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ELIZABETH A. WHALON,

Appellant,

Vs.

TRUSTEES, ROOSEVELT COUNTY

SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 64

Respondent.

Respondent.

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Appellant Elizabeth Whalon (hereinafter "Whalon") was a non-tenured teacher at Bainville School. On April 11, 1989, Respondent Bainville School Board (hereinafter "the Board"), voted to nonrenew Whalon. Whalon requested reasons for her nonrenewal by letter dated April 17, 1989. The Board provided her with the reason in a letter dated April 19, 1989, which stated:

The reason for the decision was a failure to secure proper and necessary teacher certification in a timely fashion as required by law.

On May 3, 1989, Whalon filed an appeal with the Roosevelt County Superintendent of Schools. The County Superintendent requested and received briefs from both parties and issued an Order on July 10, 1989, affirming the decision of the Board to terminate the employment status of Whalon and dismissing the

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appeal. Whalon appealed the Order of the County Superintendent to the State Superintendent on August 4, 1989. The parties filed briefs and oral argument was heard on November 28, 1989.

Having reviewed the complete record, the briefs of the parties, and having heard oral argument, this State Superintendent now makes the following decision.

DECISION AND ORDER

The State Superintendent of Public Instruction has jurisdiction of this appeal under Section 20-3-107(1)(a), MCA.

A nontenured teacher has very limited rights to appeal his/her nonrenewal of employment by the board of trustees of a school district. In accordance with Section 20-4-206, MCA, the nontenured teacher may appeal if the board fails to respond to a timely request for written reasons. In addition, the nonrenewed nontenured teacher also has the right to an evidentiary hearing before the County Superintendent of Schools to prove that the school board abused its discretion in reaching its decision not to renew the teacher's contract.

This matter is remanded to the County Superintendent of Schools of Roosevelt County with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing in accordance with Rules of Procedure for all School Controversy Contested Cases, 10.6.101 et seq., Administrative Rules of Montana, and issue a final order in accordance with the decision in this appeal. The County

Superintendent of Schools shall admit evidence relevant to deciding the following issue: Whether the Board of Trustees of Roosevelt County School District No. 64 abused its discretion when it decided not to renew Whalon's teaching contract for the reason stated in its letter of April 19, 1989.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The Montana Supreme Court, in <u>Bridger Education Association v. Board of Trustees</u>, 41 St. Rep. 533 678 P.2d 659 (1984), concluded the legislature created a legal privilege for nontenured teachers when it amended Section 20-4-206, MCA, requiring that the board of trustees furnish a written statement of the reasons for nonrenewal within 10 days of the receipt of a written request from the nonrenewed teacher. The Court concluded the legislature "must have intended to grant something of meaning when the requirement for stating reasons, upon request, was written into the statute. The specified reason 'to find a better teacher' serves no purpose."

Since the <u>Bridger</u> decision, school districts have argued that a nonrenewed nontenured teacher is not entitled to an **evidentiary hearing** before the County Superintendent under the Rules of School Controversy promulgated by the State Superintendent and set forth in Title 10, Chapter 6, subchapter 1, of the Administrative Rules of Montana (ARM). County Superintendents and the former State Superintendent accepted jurisdiction over appeals from nonrenewed nontenured teachers for

the purposes of determining whether a board of trustees gave the teacher "written reasons" upon a timely request and whether the given reasons meet the "Bridger test." However, County Superintendents have held and the former State Superintendent affirmed that a nonrenewed nontenured teacher is not entitled to present evidence in accordance with 10.6.116, ARM, to test the veracity of the stated reasons. Wanty v. Trustees, Carbon County School District No. 34-3, 5 Ed.Law 10 (OSPI 1986) and Schulte v. School District No. 24, 5 Ed. Law 13 (OSPI 1986). Thus, there has been created an anomaly--a contested case procedure where the parties cannot present evidence.

The main argument of respondent boards of trustees is based on the conclusion that permitting nonrenewed nontenured teachers a right to an evidentiary hearing is akin to granting "instant tenure." The nonrenewed nontenured teachers argue that clearly the legislature did not intend that a board of trustees could rely on its creative imagination to "concoct" reasons for its decision not to renew a nontenured teacher's contract.

This State Superintendent is persuaded that it was not the intent of the legislature to insulate the reasons required under Section 20-4-206, MCA, from all scrutiny. Likewise, she is persuaded that the legislature did not intend to require a board of trustees to prove "good cause" for nonrenewal of a nontenured teacher's contract. As the Board argues, that would create "instant tenure." Are these the only alternatives? No. This

Superintendent believes there is another alternative.

One of the official duties of the board of trustees is the employment of teachers for the district. Section 20-3-324(1), MCA states:

As prescribed elsewhere in this title, the trustees of each district shall:

(1) employ or dismiss a teacher, principal, or other assistant upon the recommendation of the district superintendent, the county high school principal, or other principal as the board considers necessary, accepting or rejecting any recommendation as the trustees in their sole discretion determine, in accordance with the provisions of Title 20, chapter 4.

In addition, a board's employment decisions must comply with the specific requirements of Title 20, Chapter 4, Part 2, MCA. Section 20-4-206 applies to the nonrenewal of a nontenured teacher's contract. Under these statutes the board of trustees of a school district is permitted to exercise its discretion in making nontenured teacher employment decisions. However, even discretion has its limits. The Montana Supreme Court discussed abuse of discretion in Jeppeson v. State of Montana, Department of State Lands, 40 St. Rptr. 1272, 667 P.2d 428 (1983), and stated:

At the outset, we reemphasize that the discretionary powers vested in the respondent department are broad in scope. Abuse of discretion, on the other hand, is not

subject to as broad an interpretation. This Court has held that abuse of discretion involves: "not merely an error in judgment, but perversity of will, prejudice, passion, or moral delinquency, but it does not necessarily imply wrong-doing or a breach of trust, or import bad

faith; it conveys, rather the idea of acting beyond the limit of discretion; the disregard of the evidence adduced; the basing of a decision upon incompetent or insufficient evidence; an exercise of discretion to an end or purpose not justified by, and clearly against, reason and evidence; a clear error in law in the circumstances. [Citations omitted.]

ID at 1277 (citing <u>Taylor v. County Commissioners</u>, 128 Mont.102, 111 and 112 (1954) with approval.)

This Superintendent believes a board of trustees has broad discretionary power when deciding not to renew a nontenured teacher's contract. She is also of the opinion that a board of trustees of a school district can abuse its discretionary power. It is her opinion that a nonrenewed nontenured teacher has a right to an evidentiary hearing to prove that the board of trustees abused its discretion. This is a heavy burden.

In regard to the board's decision not to renew the contract of a nontenured teacher, the board is entitled to the disputable presumption that it acted with discretion. In an appeal by a nontenured teacher, the board of trustees is not required to prove that it had "good cause" for the nonrenewal. The teacher has the burden of proving that the board abused its discretion in deciding not to renew the nontenured teacher's contract.

This Superintendent believes that providing a nonrenewed nontenured teacher the opportunity to prove that a board of trustees abused its discretion will put boards of trustees on notice that they are not free to make arbitrary and capricious decisions. Such a hearing will help insure that the reasons relied

upon by a board to decide not to renew a nontenured teacher's contract do, in fact, inform the teacher of "the undesirable qualities which merit a refusal to enter into a further contract."

The Supreme Court in <u>Jeppeson</u> used the following phrases to describe abuse of discretion: "the disregard of the evidence adduced; the basing of a decision upon incompetent or insufficient evidence; an exercise of discretion to an end or purpose not justified by, and clearly against, reason and evidence; a clear error in law in the circumstances." (Emphasis added.) Only through a hearing process that admits relevant evidence will the trier of fact be able to decide whether a board of trustees abused its discretion in not renewing the contract of a nontenured teacher.

The remaining issue in this appeal is whether the hearing should be held before a Court of competent jurisdiction or a County Superintendent in accordance with rules adopted by the State Superintendent under Section 20-3-107, MCA.

Easton v. Trustees, Missoula County School District No. 11, 5 Ed. Law 190 (OSPI 1986); and Cummings v. Missoula County Trustees, 6 Ed. Law 18 (OSPI 1987) have been cited for the contention that a nontenured teacher has "recourse in the judicial forum" if the teacher believes the reasons given the board are false. It is not prudent to require an appellant to file an action and pursue a remedy in two separate forums, administrative and judicial, to obtain a complete remedy. A

nontenured teacher would have to file an appeal with the County Superintendent to determine whether or not the written reasons met the "Bridger test" as well as a writ in district court to have the court determine whether reasons given by the board were true.

Section 20-3-107(3), MCA, states:

In order to establish a uniform method of hearing and determining matters of controversy arising under this title, the superintendent of public instruction shall prescribe and enforce rules of practice and regulations for the conduct of hearings and the determination of appeals by all school officials of the state.

In addressing the jurisdiction of a County Superintendent of Schools, the Montana Supreme Court held that under Section 20-3-210, MCA, the County Superintendent must hear and decide all matters of controversy arising as a result of decisions of the board of trustees. The court held that as a general rule a claimant in the school system must exhaust administrative remedies before filing a complaint or petition in district Court. general rules has three limited exceptions. These exceptions are situations where state agencies have been directly granted primary jurisdiction, where the matter is governed by a specific statute or where the board has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. Canyon Creek Education Assoc. v. Board of Trustees, Yellowstone County School District No. 4, 47 St. Rptr. 93 (1990), (explaining Throssell v. Board of Trustees of Gallatin County School District, 45 St. Rep. 1228 (1988).

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nontenured teacher should be heard and decided by a County Superintendent in accordance with rules controversy adopted under 20-3-107, MCA. She believes the legislature intended to establish a uniform method of hearing and deciding school controversies. There is no statutory grant of jurisdiction to a District Court to hear a nontenured teacher's allegation that the reasons given by a board of trustees for nonrenewal are false. In order to get a hearing before a district court, the nontenured teacher would have to rely on an extraordinary writ and contend that there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

This State Superintendent believes that an appeal by a

In summary, this decision does not grant "instant tenure" to nontenured teachers. It does provide an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing before a county superintendent at which the nonrenewed nontenured teacher has the burden of proving that the board of trustees abused its discretion in arriving at the decision to not renew the teacher's contract. This is clearly different than in an appeal of a board decision by a terminated tenured teacher. When a tenured teacher appeals the board of trustees termination decision, the board, not the teacher, has the burden of proving that it had "good cause" for the termination. The nontenured teacher has the burden of proof in an abuse of discretion hearing.

DATED this _23 day of March, 1990.

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NANCY KEENAN

10.6.128 APPELLATE PROCEDURE - DECISION (1) The decision and order of the superintendent of public instruction shall be final, subject to the proper legal remedies int he state/federal courts. Such proceedings shall be commenced no later than 60 day after the date of the decision and order of the state superintendent of public instruction.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on this 23^{Rd} day of March, 1990, a true and exact copy of the foregoing <u>DECISION AND ORDER</u> was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:

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